On 27 October 2026, the European Commission presented its proposal for a new Frontex Regulation. The proposal would massively expand Frontex’s powers, staff, budget and activities, both inside and outside the EU. At the same time, some of the already very weak Fundamental Rights safeguards will be further weakened. We oppose this proposal of the new regulation and call for an International Action Day on 18 December 2026, asking groups in all countries to participate however they can. Find here the callout for the Action Day and below our analysis of the new regulation proposal. 

1. Tripling Frontex’s border force and massively increasing its funding

What are the planned changes?

  • The EU wants to increase Frontex’s standing corps from 10,000 to 30,000 officers by 2041. This includes creating a new European Border and Return Reserve, made up of national officers trained by Frontex.
  • Frontex officers would also receive more powers to act independently. They could intercept people at borders, search vehicles and belongings, identify people for deportation and carry out deportations by air, land or sea.
  • The proposal also removes the general requirement for national border guards to be physically present when Frontex officers use force. 
  • The rules on the use of force would also change. The specific requirement that handcuffs are used only on people who pose a danger to themselves or others would be removed and replaced by broader criteria. The same applies to the use of batons and pepper spray. The use of service dogs would be explicitly allowed, while several specific safeguards concerning the oversight of force would be removed from the annex.
  • The European Commission has proposed a budget of €11.9 billion for Frontex for 2028–2034. The reform adds additional possibilities for Frontex to access more funds, including a duty for the Commission to consider the Agency as a priority partner when engaging third parties in Union funded projects. 
  • Frontex would also be able to help determine priorities for EU research and innovation funding while receiving funding from the same programmes.
Why is this problematic?
  • This would mean a massive expansion of the EU’s militarised border regime, with more officers, more equipment and more powers to stop, detain and deport people on the move. For people on the move this will mean more violent and deadly borders. 
  • Billions of euros would be spent on strengthening border enforcement instead of providing housing, healthcare, education and support for people on the move.One year of Frontex’s proposed budget could instead fund: 
    • A year of schooling for 121,000 students (Germany 2024)
    • More than 5,000 energy-efficient social homes (Barcelona)
    • A year of healthcare for 3,800 people (EU average cost 2023)
    • EU resettlement support for more than 125,000 people 
    • More than 725,000 basic German language courses at Goethe institute 
    • More than 1,400 rescue ships like SOS Humanity
  • The expansion would also strengthen the border-industrial complex, including the arms and security industry that profits from border surveillance and enforcement.

2. Turning Frontex into the central EU deportation agency

What are the planned changes?
  • Frontex would become the central EU agency for planning, coordinating and carrying out deportations. It would be involved in practically every step of the deportation process, from identifying people and obtaining travel documents to organising deportation flights and so-called reintegration assistance. A new Return Coordination Centre would be established within Frontex to coordinate these activities.
  • A new SIRENE office would give Frontex access to additional information from the Schengen Information System concerning deportations and refusals of entry.
  • A new hit/no-hit system would allow Europol and Eurojust to check whether Frontex holds personal data relevant to their work, further conflating migration and security issues.
  • Frontex would be able to restrict people’s rights to access, correct or erase their personal data under certain conditions. The proposal would also facilitate systematic transfers of deportation-related personal data to third countries.
  • Under Articles 63 and 64, Frontex could support deportations starting from countries outside the EU. This includes deportations carried out under the laws of those countries, even when there is no deportation decision from an EU member state.
  • Member states would have to submit annual deportation plans to Frontex, including their priorities regarding the nationalities and profiles of people they intend to deport.
  • The ‘effectiveness’ of deportations would also become part of how Frontex assesses the situation at EU borders. A high border-security risk level could be mitigated if people can be deported ‘effectively’.
Why is this problematic?
  • The proposal would create a much more powerful and coordinated EU-wide deportation system, designed to deport people faster and more ruthlessly.
  • Some have compared the proposed expansion of Frontex to the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, ICE. While this comparison has its limits, since national authorities would continue to play a central role, the proposal would clearly bring Frontex closer to the powers held by the US-American agency.
  • By connecting migration databases with police and security systems, the EU would further increase the surveillance and criminalisation of people simply because of their migration status.
  • The ability to carry out deportations from third countries could facilitate chain deportations, where people are moved from one country to another without any effective access to protection. It would also make it harder to establish who is responsible when human rights are violated.
  • Together with the EU’s plans for return hubs, this could contribute to a system in which people are deported to countries they have never even set foot in.
  • Linking border-security assessments to how effectively people can be deported makes clear that the EU treats the presence of people on the move as a security problem to be solved by removing them.

3. Weakening fundamental rights monitoring and accountability

What are the planned changes?
  • Under the current regulation, at least one fundamental rights monitor must be assigned to every Frontex operation. Under the new proposal, monitors would instead be assigned based on a risk assessment prepared by the Fundamental Rights Officer in coordination with Frontex’s Executive Director.
  • During crisis situations and deployments of the new quick reaction force, fundamental rights monitoring would take place only after the operation, unless the member state concerned requests earlier monitoring.
  • The work of the Fundamental Rights Officer would also be more clearly limited to activities carried out by Frontex staff. When national border guards are involved in rights violations during joint operations, the information would be passed on to national authorities and Frontex would not have to do anything about it. 
Why is this problematic?
  • Frontex’s existing fundamental rights monitoring mechanisms have already failed to prevent or ensure accountability for human rights violations at Europe’s borders, which is why we demand the abolition of the agency and the system it represents. The proposal would make some of these safeguards even weaker.
  • Monitoring operations only afterwards means that violations may only be investigated after people have already been pushed back, deported or harmed.
  • Limiting Frontex’s monitoring responsibilities when national border guards are involved would make it easier for Frontex to claim ignorance of pushbacks or torture committed by national border guards, and to escape legal accountability. 

 

4. More border externalisation

What are the planned changes?
  • The proposal would make it easier for Frontex to cooperate with non-EU countries through more flexible agreements, including agreements limited to particular operations or geographical areas.
  • Frontex could provide technical assistance to non-EU countries, such as training, capacity building and support for so-called voluntary returns and reintegration, without necessarily needing a formal long-term cooperation agreement.
  • Frontex could also deploy teams at shared border crossing points with non-EU countries, including on the non-EU side of the border.
  • Cooperation with non-EU countries would include more training, technical support and information exchange. This would also involve sharing surveillance information through EUROSUR.
Why is this problematic?
  • The EU would further extend its border controls into countries outside Europe, aiming to stop people from reaching EU borders in the first place. This means pushing people onto even more dangerous routes, exposing them to more violence and making it harder for them to reach safety.
  • Cooperation with third-country border authorities also strengthens authoritarian regimes and security forces responsible for serious human rights abuses.
  • Sharing personal and surveillance data with non-EU authorities can put people at risk, especially those fleeing persecution because of their political beliefs, religion, sexual orientation or other reasons. Although the regulation prohibits certain data transfers that could expose people to serious human rights violations, questions remain about how these safeguards would be enforced in practice.

5. Strengthening EUROSUR and other surveillance

What are the planned changes?
  • The proposal would further expand EUROSUR, Frontex’s border surveillance and information-sharing system. This includes greater use of satellite imagery, aerial surveillance and other technologies to monitor people on the move, including outside EU borders.
  • EUROSUR would also cover so-called ‘hybrid threats’ and include new early-warning mechanisms to identify movement of groups of people.
  • Frontex would gain more flexibility to buy, lease and co-own equipment and to purchase equipment together with member states and other EU institutions.
  • It would also have a stronger role in research, innovation, pilot projects and the testing and deployment of new surveillance and border-control technologies.
  • The proposal explicitly includes NATO, the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), the European Space Agency and several aviation organisations among Frontex’s possible cooperation partners.
  • Frontex could also agree on binding EUROSUR cooperation plans directly with authorities in non-EU countries, even when it is not carrying out an operation there.
  • Frontex would be allowed to process more categories of personal data, including data concerning people crossing or attempting to cross borders of non-EU countries where Frontex operations take place. This means collecting data about people who may never have entered the EU.
Why is this problematic?
  • The expansion would allow Frontex and other authorities to monitor people on the move even further beyond Europe’s borders, including before they attempt to enter the EU.
  • This surveillance can be used to facilitate pushbacks and pullbacks, preventing people from reaching safety and exposing them to detention, violence and abuse.
  • Expanding the collection and sharing of personal data creates violates people’s privacy and is dangerous particularly for people fleeing repression and persecution.
  • The inclusion of NATO, a military alliance, also shows the increasingly close connection between migration control and military and security policies.
  • More investment in surveillance technologies would also mean more public money for the border-industrial complex and the companies profiting from border militarisation.

6. Social media monitoring

What are the planned changes?
  • Frontex would establish a new Online Monitoring and Response Centre to monitor publicly accessible online content relating to border crossings, migration routes, migrant smuggling and so-called ‘hybrid threats’.
  • The centre could notify online platforms about content it categorises as illegal, including by acting as a trusted flagger under the Digital Services Act. It could also ask national authorities to take action against this online content.
  • Information collected through this monitoring would feed into EUROSUR’s European Situational Picture, allowing the results to be shared with other relevant EU authorities and agencies.
Why is this problematic?
  • Information about migration routes, border crossings and conditions along the way could increasingly be treated as a security threat, even though people on the move may depend on such information to make decisions about their journeys.
  • Giving Frontex a role in monitoring and flagging online content could put pressure on platforms to remove information and discourage people from sharing it. This is potentially problematic for migrant solidarity networks, especially if information-sharing or assistance is treated as facilitating irregular migration.

7. A broader role for Frontex in visa policy

What are the planned changes?
  • A new Frontex Visa Support Office would assist EU member states and their consulates with visa-related risk analysis, detecting document fraud and identifying alleged visa abuse.
  • Frontex would also provide training and support related to visa and residence permit checks, including in cooperation with authorities outside the EU.
Why is this problematic?
  • This would expand Frontex’s influence over migration control even before people reach EU borders, making it easier to prevent people from travelling to Europe.
  • Visa policies are already used to exclude people based on where they come from and which passport they hold. Giving Frontex a greater role in visa-related risk analysis could reinforce these inequalities.
  • Risk assessments based on nationalities, countries and perceived migration patterns can lead to discrimination and racial profiling.
  • Instead of making it easier for people to move safely, the EU would further strengthen the systems used to prevent them from travelling in the first place.
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